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Epstein’s Insights about Private Law and History for  
Intellectual Property and Trade of Today and Tomorrow 
F. Scott Kieff 1
ABSTRACT 
Richard Epstein’s work on private law emphasizes themes that have survived since 
Ancient Roman Law.  This paper highlights two practical benefits that those themes can offer 
some flashpoints in modern debates about the interface between intellectual property (IP) and 
trade.  Arguments grounded in private law may avoid the open-textured public policy debates 
between concern over too much or too little protection for both IP and trade law while largely 
addressing the major stated concerns raised by both sides.  They also can avoid many arcane 
doctrines within both IP and trade law.  Private law’s attention to business norms helped the 
Grokster case explore a modern on-line services’ liability for indirect IP infringement.  Private 
law’s common law approach to agency can similarly help address joint liability for IP infringement 
around modern on-line services after Limelight.  Private law also may help address business 
opportunism around trade in electronic transmissions and set top boxes.   
1 F. SCOTT KIEFF is the Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor at George Washington University Law School and the 
founder of Kieff Strategies LLC, which brings together fellow academics, former government officials, and business 
practitioners to collaboratively engage complex challenges facing firms in technology, finance, business, and law. 
From October 18, 2013, through June 30, 2017, he was a Commissioner of the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(ITC) who participated as an individual adjudicator in many of the investigations discussed herein.  These views are 
those of the author only, having been reached in his role as an individual adjudicator in those investigations, and are 
not properly attributable to the ITC or any of its other Members or Staff. The author gratefully acknowledges the 
many helpful contributions to these ideas from the parties, their counsel, members of the commenting public, and 
the ITC staff.   
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I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Epstein’s work is as powerful as it is prolific, spanning an enormous range of topics 
within the law.  A scholar of Roman Law, British Law at the time of our nation’s founding, and the 
Founders’ approach to our Constitutional Order, Richard’s work is perfused with historical 
insight.  Much of Richard’s work has focused on private ordering among individuals and firms in 
the marketplace, with particular focus on how law can advance overall welfare by providing 
opportunities for economic growth.  He emphasizes property rights within a limited government 
framework, as powerful tools for unleashing individual’s liberty interests and improving overall 
economic growth.  Richard’s work has informed contemporary policy discussions by elucidating 
causal links between the efficiencies and inefficiencies of certain aspects of the patterns of 
behavior private parties were historically allowed to do and prohibited from doing, and the 
particular mechanisms of the governing systems of property rights, contracts, and 
misappropriation or unfair competition at those times.  This paper explores how some of the 
basic insights about private law that Richard has highlighted from history can inform the fields of 
IP and trade today and tomorrow. 
Despite my having trained outside of Richard’s host schools, it’s a testament to his 
openness, curiosity, and generosity, that his broad searches for collaborators offered me the 
good fortune to become a close student of his work by becoming a colleague of his on so many 
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projects.2  But the influence of Richard’s ideas was too helpful to stop with those collaborations.  
It thankfully stayed with me on work I’ve done without him, including several projects in the post 
I just left as a Commissioner of the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC).  In this paper I will 
explore some key themes often highlighted in Richard’s work that helped me better understand 
several of those cutting-edge issues in that role at the ITC when working on cases at the interface 
between IP and international trade.  These themes from Richard’s work might also help illuminate 
a path forward for private parties and policy makers of tomorrow as they face similar ongoing 
issues.   
 
The ITC is notoriously linked to the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 (Pub. L. No. 
71-361, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified in various sections of Title 19 of the United States 
Code)), which has again taken center stage in contemporary policy debates about more 
aggressively political trade measures.  Yet, it is rooted in the post-Civil War Tariff Commission 
designed largely by the famous Harvard economics professor Frank Taussig, who was appointed 
 
2 We have been colleagues as members of various academic groups, including from 1999-2006 on the Immune 
Tolerance Network’s Conflict of Interest Committee at the MacLean Center for Medical Ethics at the University of 
Chicago Medical School; in the Spring of 2001 when he was Acting Dean and I was Visiting Assistant Professor at the 
University of Chicago Law School; from 2003-2013 and again from June 2017 to June 2018 as fellows at Stanford 
University’s Hoover Institution; from 2007-2013 on the Hoover Project on Commercializing Innovation; and from 
2008-2013 on the Hoover Task Force on Property Rights, Freedom, and Prosperity.  Over the same time period, we 
also have collaborated on various private sector consulting projects.  We also have been co-authors, including:  
Epstein, Kieff, and Spulber (2012); Epstein and Kieff (2011); Epstein, Kieff, and Spulber (2011); Epstein and Kieff 
(2009); Epstein and Kieff (2009); Epstein and Kieff (2007); Epstein et al. (2006).  
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the first Chair of that commission, to de-politicize the import component of US international 
trade as an agency structured to do only fact-finding, analysis, adjudication, and technical 
advising, leaving policy-making to the political branches of government.3 
 
 The adjudicatory portions of the ITC’s docket are generally recognized to include two 
basic categories of cases (more precisely termed “investigations”): the Title VII portion, which is 
filled mostly with issues of anti-dumping and countervailing duty law; and the Section 337 
portion, sometimes also referred to as the “unfair competition” portion, which is most known for 
cases focused on IP law.4  Although most known for IP, the ITC’s Section 337 docket is much 
broader, meeting the statute’s mandate to address “unfair competition.”5   
 
This paper explores several specific flashpoints in modern debates about the precise 
contours of the broad mandate in Section 337.  It shows how many of the insights from the 
literature on private law to which Richard has contributed much could in turn offer some practical 
leverage to those modern debates within some high-profile cases that otherwise are thought to 
primarily belong to the domains of IP law and trade law.  My aim is to highlight a single theme – 
 
3 See generally, Dobson (1976).   
4 For a review of the ITC’s law and practice in these areas, see, generally, Kieff (2017).   
5 Section 337 instructs the ITC to investigate and adjudicate claims of “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair 
acts in the importation of articles . . . into the United States, or in the sale of such articles by the owner, importer, or 
consignee,…” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(l)(A).   
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which is that simply following some basics of the approach to private law that has so long been 
a focus of Richard’s work can lead to easier analyses as well as perhaps different outcomes in 
some high-profile IP cases that too frequently otherwise tend to get hotly debated in one of two 
more common rubrics: either as an open-textured public policy spat between too much and too 
little, or as a matter of the arcane and complicated features buried deep within a particular 
substantive law regime’s internal doctrine.   
 
In so doing, the paper recognizes that, especially when a case gets to the level of an en 
banc appellate body, such as review of an ALJ determination by the six Commissioners at the ITC, 
and especially at the highest level when before the Supreme Court, it can be very seductive to 
frame the debate in one of these two more common rubrics.  Both advocates and adjudicators 
can be drawn by the seeming flexibility of open-textured public policy as well as by the seeming 
restraint of arcane black-letter doctrine.   
 
Yet, the basic themes of private law can provide a different – and in some ways preferable 
– blend of risks and opportunities.  This central risk is that historical roots of private law can 
require more explanation to an audience of clients, judges, and other government decision-
makers who often are more versed in and drawn towards contemporary public policy.  Historical 
intricacies of private law can appear even more arcane than the debates specialized advocates 
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and lower tribunal adjudicators often engage deep within the black letter law outlines of IP and 
trade.  The central opportunities are that a private law approach can be fully accessible to an 
audience of generalist adjudicators; and may offer a chance for much greater payoff, so long as 
it is presented at the outset of a case and sustained throughout.   
 
To be sure, there are many private and social costs and benefits that flow from both 
complexity and simplicity; and this paper does not suggest that simple is always better, from the 
perspective of either a party, an advocate, an adjudicator, or a policy-making social planner.   
Instead, the paper offers the more modest payoff of providing a roadmap grounded in private 
law and history that anyone -- party, advocate, adjudicator, or policy-making social planner – may 
find simpler to follow when addressing modern cases at the interface of IP and trade than 
navigating the arcane details of each black letter law regime and that simultaneously has the 
benefit of largely addressing at least the central stated concerns of both sides in competing policy 
debates.   
 
Before getting deeper into substantive discussion, one final introductory note on 
terminology may help.  In this paper, the term “private law” is used in keeping with its widely 
accepted meaning, which refers to the set of rules primarily governing how individuals and 
businesses interact with each other, in contrast to public law as those rules primarily governing 
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how these private actors interact with government bodies and how government bodies interact 
with each other.6  Following a private law approach to legal rules like those governing property 
rights and contracts can, in turn, facilitate private ordering and economic growth by encouraging 
and enabling private actors to directly engage each other more than the government.7  Each 
substantive discussion that follows builds on an important example of Richard’s contribution to 
the study of both the sources and mechanisms of private law that focus on either custom, the 
common law, or core themes about how property actually operates in practice, or some 
combination.8  
II. CUSTOM AND MODERN ON-LINE SERVICES’ LIABILITY FOR INDIRECT IP INFRINGEMENT  
Much of Richard’s work emphasizes the beneficial role of custom as a source of private 
law throughout history.9  While Richard’s work along this vein has reached the early business 
activities involving the electronic transmission of information for news-wire services about a 
 
6 See, e.g., Goldberg (2012).   
7 The approach followed here emphasizes the detailed legal mechanisms used to structure entitlements, rather than 
simply how many entitlements there are or how powerful the consequences are for breach or trespass.  See, e.g., 
Haber, Kieff, and Paredes (2008) (referring to property rights and contracts “at their best” and “at their worst” when 
structured differently based on their impact on private ordering); and Kieff and Paredes (2004) (showing how at least 
explicit recognition of core consensus “basics” of particular private law legal regimes can facilitate both economic 
growth and diverse social engagement by earning an honest broker reputation that can draw in democratic 
participation as those regimes evolve while stimulating investment).  
8 See, e.g., Epstein (2016); Epstein (2010); Epstein (1992).  
9 See, e.g., Epstein (1992).   
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century ago,10 the same approach yielded great success for the copyright plaintiffs suing modern 
internet-based file-sharing services in the 2005 Grokster case (MGM v. Grokster, 545 US 913 
(2005)).11  Although not from the ITC, Grokster is a striking example of the power that can be 
conferred by invoking basic private law intuitions; and since it occurred at the Supreme Court 
level it binds all lower courts and tribunals including the ITC.   
 
Grokster was one front in the ongoing battle royale in the field of IP that is essentially 
between the content industries – movie studios, music labels, producers, musicians, and the like 
– and the high-tech service industries – providers of internet connectivity, and of search, storage, 
and playback systems and software.  The plaintiffs were holders of copyrights in movies, songs, 
and the like.  545 US at p. 920 (“A group of copyright holders (MGM for short, but including 
motion picture studios, recording companies, songwriters, and music publishers)”.  The 
defendants were distributors of free software that enabled direct, peer-to-peer, file-sharing 
between users without the use of intermediary servers between them, thereby leaving the 
 
10 See, Epstein (1992) (discussing the famous business and legal conflict between the two main news-wire services 
of the early 1900s: International News Service, or INS, and the Associated Press, or AP, regarding copying of “hot-
news” reporting from Europe during World War I that was first printed in the morning editions of newspapers on 
the east coast of the US and then copied by a competitor when time for the morning editions of the west coast 
papers).    
11 Similar cases were brought against the file-sharing services Napster and Aimster, with each case of course 
involving different facts material to the liability analysis.  A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (2001) (Ninth 
Circuit affirming ND Cal. on peer-to-peer file-sharing service Napster’s liability for contributory and vicarious 
copyright infringement); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (Judge Posner writing for the 
Seventh Circuit affirming ND IL. Grant of preliminary injunction against Aimster file-sharing service).   
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plaintiffs facing a broad and diffuse swath of many potential direct copyright infringers (senders 
and receivers of copied files) rather than a small number of intermediaries operating large-
volume file-servers.  545 US at p. 920.  A key characteristic of the service was that it could be 
used to share files of any type – whether subject to copyright or not, whether any applicable 
copyrights were owned by the plaintiffs or not – and for any purpose – whether the purposes 
would infringe under copyright law or not, such as perhaps when copying is allowed as a fair use.  
This left the plaintiffs facing a commercial actor that was interfering with the plaintiffs business 
interest in copyrighted files but were not, themselves, directly interacting with – let alone copying 
– the copyrighted files, themselves; and instead were providing software that enabled other 
users of the software to send and receive copies of potentially copyrighted files in potentially 
infringing ways.  The issue the Court addressed was “under what circumstances the distributor 
of a product capable of both lawful and unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright infringement 
by third parties using the product.”  545 US at pp. 918-19. The Court held that liability was 
appropriate where the distribution was done with the “object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.” 
545 US at p. 919. 
 
In Grokster, the open textured public policy debate of too much versus too little mapped 
well onto the debate internal to the copyright regime about the doctrine known as contributory 
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infringement.  On the policy level, one side fanned the flames of fear that piracy would abound, 
while the other side fanned the flames of fear that any multi-use technology amenable to 
possible infringing use would be forever banned, and the internet would be unduly taxed or even 
shut down.  Analogies and hypotheticals frequently focused on examples like the photocopy 
machine and the video-cassette recorder.  On the doctrinal level, the debate often boiled down 
to how many alternative non-infringing uses would be enough to protect a dual-use technology 
(capable of both infringing and non-infringing uses) from the risks of the inunctions or high 
damages awards that can flow from infringement liability?  After all, since at least the 1984 Sony 
Betamax decision, contributory infringement in copyright law largely had turned on the degree 
of legitimate non-infringing uses that could be made of a particular copying technology.  Sony v. 
Universal City Studios, 464 US 417 (1984). 
 
The winning argument in the case took a different approach, grounded in private law.12  
In keeping with Richard’s study of custom and private law, there is a long tradition in private law 
of holding liable those who willfully interfere with other people’s property or business 
relationships.13  Sure, it’s always hard to know what darkness lurks within the hearts and minds 
 
12 Don Verilli was the lead attorney for the plaintiffs in that case and later served as Solicitor General.   
13 See, e.g., Epstein (2016, at pp. 1515-16) (common law’s traditional private law theories of unfairness were based 
on the coercive nature of an interaction by either force or fraud, including even the taint thereof when outside the 
ordinary course of business).   
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of other people, which makes actually proving these business torts often difficult.  But proof of 
mental state is not so hard when written in one’s own hand to solicit investors.  Grokster, the 
defendant company in that suit, turns out to have sold itself to investors in part on the promise 
that its user base would be profitably enlarged to a significant degree by attracting those users 
who wanted to download content they neither owned nor licensed.  Suddenly there was an easy 
way to help the Court draw a line between companies of the modern internet era who would be 
saddled with liability and who wouldn’t.   
 
At the same time, this approach largely embraced the competing policy concerns of both 
sides.  IP owners could get practical redress against commercial actors who were deliberately 
targeting the economic value of their IP, while anyone worried on a policy level about accidental 
infringers and an ever-expanding slippery slope of the scope of IP protection could easily avoid 
liability.  The argument based in custom and private law focused on intent.  Businesses worried 
about accidental liability could take comfort if they just didn’t intend.   
 
The Supreme Court adopted this private law argument – entirely, and unanimously.  
Indeed, the private law intuition was so powerful that it gave the Court enough energy to import 
from Title 35 in the US Code governing Patent Law the inducement of infringement doctrine from 
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that Title’s Section 271(b) into a different Title of the Code, Copyright Law’s Title 17, which did 
not even have a corresponding statutory provision on point.   
 
While the outcome favored the plaintiff, the line of reasoning gave a degree of clarity to 
both sides of the broader policy debate over how broad the protection for IP should be.  Intending 
to reach over the line to poach from someone else’s business through induced infringement, 
while nominally dancing close to a different line about the limits of contributory infringement, 
can still be seen through the eyes of custom as improper.  Litigation counsel for IP owners can 
easily make the argument.  Business planning counsel for potential defendants in such suits can 
easily avoid it.   
 
III. COMMON LAW AND JOINT LIABILITY FOR IP INFRINGEMENT AROUND MODERN ON-LINE 
SERVICES 
As Richard reminds us in Epstein (2016), the common law is another source of private law, 
especially when focused on relationships among people inside business organizations.  While 
Richard has explored the common law as a source of the law of insider trading, this section 
explores the common law as a source of the law governing joint liability for IP infringement by 
considering long-standing doctrines of agency law and partnership law in the context of the 2014 
Limelight case.  Limelight v. Akamai, 572 U.S. 915 (2014). That case turned on an IP doctrine 
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related to Grokster’s indirect infringement that is colloquially called “divided infringement” or 
“joint infringement,” and involves a patented method having all of its steps practiced across 
multiple entities, but where no single entity is practicing all of the steps.  The Supreme Court in 
Limelight denied liability, unanimously rejecting various arguments to expand established 
doctrines within the patent law system, largely basing its analysis on the concern that the 
doctrine of inducement of infringement that had played such a large role in Grokster would 
become too unconstrained if the underlying act of direct infringement on which it must be 
predicated could itself include situations in which no single entity has directly infringed.   572 US 
at p. 922 (“Federal Circuit's contrary view would deprive [the inducement doctrine] of 
ascertainable standards”). 
 
This is where a private law approach might have offered an easy solution for plaintiff’s 
counsel. The idea is a simple one.14  It’s borrowed from an infamous question that shows up 
somewhere on most final exams in courses on business associations – and Bar Exams that test 
on that field – about the failed attempt for several parties to follow the right formalities when 
trying to set up a limited liability enterprise like a corporation.  Among business law professors 
 
14 It’s been explored in patent law textbooks for a few years, see, e.g., Kieff et al. (2011, at 819-20), and seemed to 
be lurking underneath the Supreme Court oral argument in Limelight during a colloquy between Justice Sotomayor 
and Seth Waxman, a former Solicitor General who served as counsel for the patentee in that case.  Transcript of 
Supreme Court Oral Argument in Limelight v. Akamai, at 28-29 (Apr. 30, 2014).   
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it’s colloquially called the “defective formation” hypothetical.  Creating a corporation to enjoy 
the protection of limited liability requires formalities including incorporation, meetings, 
respecting the corporate form, etc.  The exam question in a law course or for Bar membership is 
designed to get students to show their awareness that the price paid for a defective attempt to 
follow those formalities isn’t a failed business or some government-imposed fine.  It’s designed 
to get them to point out that, instead, defective formation usually leaves the participants in the 
joint enterprise exposed to the legal risk that a court will follow long established common law 
and treat the joint venture as a partnership, leaving each participant liable jointly and severally – 
as a matter of partnership law and its older common law predecessor agency law – for the 
liabilities of the partnership.   
 
This gives patentees seeking liability for joint infringement some easy leverage.  The 
patentee just has to include from the start of a case the requisite pleading and proof that the key 
defendants are doing the things that will lead them to be treated under the common law as a 
partnership.  The requirements are few: generally, working together for a common business 
interest.15  The patentee then enjoys a chance to target a very large, legally distinct, virtual, or 
constructive, person as the single entity that the patentee will have to plead and prove acted in 
a way that constitutes direct patent infringement.  Put differently, the patentee now faces a 
 
15 See, Kieff et al. (2011, at 819-20).   
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single entity that comprises many actors, which makes it more likely that each step in the 
patented method is being practiced by at least one of those actors and therefore by that broader 
entity.  Applying longstanding common law principles of agency law and partnership law, a 
judgement of direct infringement by that single entity, a partnership, then exposes each general 
partner in it – each of those individual actors – to joint and several liability for the partnership’s 
infringement.   
 
As with custom, this common law approach can discern between proper and improper 
with a degree of ease.  And as with custom, while the outcome of the common law approach 
could favor the plaintiff in particular cases with facts just like Limelight, the line of reasoning gives 
a degree of clarity to both sides of the broader policy debate over how broad the protection for 
IP should be. Litigation counsel just need to be ready to plead and prove the partnership 
elements.  And business planning counsel just need to remind clients to avoid joining those 
groups committing such business torts or trespasses.   
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IV. RESPONSES TO BUSINESS OPPORTUNISM AROUND TRADE IN ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS  
Richard also has pointed out how traditions of private law have been appropriately 
vigilant to police opportunism on all sides of business transactions.16  When it comes to trade in 
modern electronic transmissions, some particular examples of potential opportunism can be 
seen through careful attention to the practical details of about how business relationships are 
shifting in response to various enforcement efforts.  Consider the increasing modern reliance on 
business models that separate out physical operational components of integrated business 
operations so as to cross national boundaries, while maintaining the runtime speeds of today’s 
fast-paced economy by reliance on electronic transmissions, as in a recent high-profile case called 
ClearCorrect involving 3-D printing.  Certain Digital Models, 337-TA-833, 2014 (ITC determination 
in ClearCorrect v. Invisalign). 
 
To be sure, many of these separated business models offer important overall efficiencies 
and should not be excessively curtailed.  But the demand for a practical legal argument may be 
particularly sharp when the separation in the business model is driven by strategic opportunism 
to circumvent established legal rules.  Once again, an approach grounded in the tradition of 
private law may offer a convenient path for reaching a practical remedy for potential plaintiffs 
 
16 See Epstein (2010, at p. 487) (rules designed to reign in opportunism by one side – such as IP infringers – can give 
too much room for opportunism by the other side – such as IP owners).    
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while largely meeting the core stated goals of the potential-defendant-side of the broader policy 
debate.   
 
The ClearCorrect case arose within the ITC’s 337 docket, where the Commission’s 
statutory power is limited to the importation of “articles.”  This raised an important question 
about whether the term “article” in that statute effectively limits the ITC from acting against 
electronic transmissions into the country.  The operative question asks, what constitutes an 
“article” under the ITC’s statute – only physical goods, or are electronic transmissions included?  
The answer has increasing relevance in the context of the increasingly common reliance on 
electronic transmissions into the US as part of distributed business models like 3-D printing, as in 
ClearCorrect. 
 
ClearCorrect began as an ordinary tangible goods case at the ITC, involving a patent on 
orthodontic alignment devices made of plastic for which the frequent adjustments many of us 
remember all too well are essentially accomplished by the frequent manufacture and installation 
of slightly different variants of many similar orthodontic devices.  Rather than installing a single 
set of metal braces and tightening or loosening particular pairs of teeth by adjusting the 
connecting wires, the patent covered a different approach in which the teeth can be slowly 
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moved by the successive application over time of many slightly different clear plastic devices 
designed to clamp across a set of teeth at once.    
 
The initial phase of the case was against a competitor who arranged for its US patients to 
get the three-dimensional geometry of their teeth electronically scanned here in the US, and then 
had those electronic maps sent to Pakistan where the sets of plastic devices would be made, 
benefitting from that country’s abundant pools of low-cost high skilled workers in the fields of 
orthodontia, plastics, and computer-assisted-manufacturing.  The foreign-built plastic implants 
were then imported into the US for installation into the mouths of patients.  After months of 
adjudication at the ITC determining patent validity and infringement, an ordinary order was 
issued to stop the importation of the plastic implants.  But that’s not where the case ended.  
Circumvention ensued.   
 
The later phase of the case that lead to the appeal focused on the circumvention of the 
prior order in which the planning and ultimate blueprint for the plastic implants were made in 
Pakistan, and then transmitted into the US in a digital file – like a PDF is for a printed document 
– so the plastic devices could then be made on a 3-D printer in each local orthodontic office in 
the US who did business with the patentee’s competitor.  The key legal issues in the case focused 
on the proper interpretation of the word “article” in the ITC’s enabling statute granting the 
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Commission power over “articles that infringe” US patents.  The ITC decided in 2014 that the 
word “article” was not limited to tangible things – it included electronic transmissions – and the 
ITC issued a cease and desist order; but the Federal Circuit reversed in 2015, and in 2016 denied 
en banc review. Certain Digital Models, 337-TA-833, 2014 (ITC determination in ClearCorrect v. 
Invisalign); ClearCorrect v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversing ITC); 
ClearCorrect v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 819 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (denying en banc review).  Most 
of the arguments in ClearCorrect were grounded in public policy and quickly became enmeshed 
in questions about whether this would unduly expand IP protection and unduly enable the ITC to 
block all digital transmissions, trapping innocent intermediaries, and blocking the internet.   
 
In contrast, if the IP owner’s pleadings and ongoing arguments in ClearCorrect had framed 
the question differently, the case could have been seen as well-grounded in the private law 
tradition and largely accommodative of the countervailing concerns about excessive IP 
protection by seeking a narrow remedy against particular infringing opportunism.  It also would 
have provided a powerful reminder of the countervailing risks from giving a green light to those 
already increasingly motivated and enabled17 to enter the broad spectrum of unfair business 
practices that take advantage of splitting across the national border.  Why would IP infringers not 
 
17 Non-IP incentives to set up business models like this in many countries like Pakistan include their educated 
workforce paired with significantly reduced regulatory protections for workers, the environment, public health and 
safety, and financial markets.   
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set up web pages accessible to the US market and merely operate their design work off-shore to 
then pump back into the US economy digital renditions of a vast range of bespoke tangible 
products that could then be locally made by vast numbers of computer-controlled machines? 
Consider plastic car taillight covers and bumpers, mixed-to-order cosmetics that are mixed like 
paints now are mixed at your local hardware store, and anything worn in or on the body such as 
the orthotics already made locally in the foot aisle of local sundries stores, and including purses, 
shoes, glasses, sunglasses, contact lenses, teeth veneers, casts, splints, prostheses, and the like.   
If the market-efficient solution in this case had been to conduct a bifurcated business model 
straddling the national border, then the case would have been less likely to have begun against 
an importer of plastic devices instead of electronic transmissions.  The split in the business model 
across the national border using electronic transmissions arose only after the private patent right 
was enforced by the lawful agency order, suggesting it was motivated by the intent to circumvent 
that order.   
 
Such a private law approach could be grounded in several historical precedents based on 
custom and the common law involving legal actions grounded in misappropriation and unfair 
competition against business models analogous to the particular circumvention in ClearCorrect 
that date back over a century to when Congress enacted the ITC’s predecessor statute containing 
the word “article.”  One example is highlighted by Richard’s work on custom, Epstein (1992), in 
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which he explores the INS v. AP case involving electronic transmissions of news articles across 
wires.  A second example borrows from Richard’s work on common law and insider trading, 
Epstein (2016), as colorfully portrayed in the movie, The Sting, and the misappropriation cases 
involving ticker-tape, telegram information and the like.18  While each of those cases involved 
more primitive electronic transmissions than the modern internet, the Court has specifically 
pointed out in the particular context of trade law, such a mere change in mode is a distinction 
without a difference.  According to The Court, importation  
 
… consists in bringing an article into a country from the outside. If there be an 
actual bringing in it is importation regardless of the mode by which it is effected.  
 
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, p. 122 (1923).    
 
The Court’s similar treatment of different modes of importation in trade cases parallels the 
Court’s similar treatment of different modes of copying in IP cases, as in the famous contributory 
infringement opinion by Justice Holmes from around the same time about the book Ben Hur, 
 
18 See, Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock, 198 US 236 (1905) (wrongful appropriation of price quotes).  Indeed, 
The Court recognized the powerfully common themes underlying these theories when it cited the Board of Trade 
decision in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 US 215, 234, 239 (1918). See also National Tel. News 
Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294 (7th Cir. 1902) (injurious appropriation of news sent by telegraph before 
printing on ticker tape).   
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despite the putative infringement arising out of what was at the time an entirely new electronic 
medium – moving pictures.19   
 
To be sure, a key benefit of embracing a private law antipathy towards such opportunistic 
circumvention for a case like ClearCorrect would be that the associated spillover risks to chilling 
innocent third parties, intermediaries, and the like is at the lowest possible level because the 
underlying order is an in-personam cease and desist order against a particular party who had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate all details of the case and lost.  Such an approach would leave 
third -party innocence kept firmly ensconced in the substantive legal tests for infringement, both 
direct and indirect, across the US IP systems.   
 
 In addition, such a private law approach to ClearCorrect happens to have the added 
benefit that it would even be consistent with arcane legal doctrine within IP.  While the patent 
system and the copyright system both have long standing contributory infringement doctrines 
that turn on whether a “material” has contributed to infringement, the copyright system has 
 
19 See, e.g., Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (contributory infringement of copyright in the book Ben 
Hur) (Holmes, J.); Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159 (2nd Cir. 1971) (contributory 
infringement of copyrights in music); Screen Gems-Columbia Music v. Mark-Fi Records, 327 F.Supp. 788 (SDNY 1971) 
(same).    
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some precedent for treating mere intangible activities as sufficient to count as providing enough 
“material” to trigger liability for contributory infringement.20   
 
In sum, ClearCorrect provides an example of how a basic insight from private law about 
viewing opportunism through the lenses of misappropriation and unfair competition may be 
helpful from a range of perspectives in addressing the type of opportunism surrounding trade in 
electronic transmissions in which an infringing business model is split across the national border.  
It happens to have the added benefit of also being grounded in precedents within the IP and 
trade legal systems.  And because it targets such specific behavior with an in-person remedy, it 
largely meets the central stated public policy concern on the other side of the IP marketplace 
about excessive IP enforcement.   
 
 Lastly, one additional basic insight from private law may be helpful to at least potential 
plaintiffs facing a different business practice that has been gaining more attention at the ITC 
involving electronic transmissions. In this business model, the trade in electronic transmissions – 
such as a television signal for which a relatively high fee is paid, usually monthly – is bundled with 
 
20 See, e.g., Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159 (2ndCir. 1971) (contributory 
infringement of copyrights in music by concert promoter); Screen Gems-Columbia Music v. Mark-Fi Records, 327 
F.Supp. 788 (SDNY 1971) (contributory infringement for promoting sales of copyrighted music through radio 
advertisements). 
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a second component that is a set-top-box. The box runs special software to provide a user-
interface for that transmission for which a relatively low fee is paid, usually monthly, if any 
nominal fee is even attributed to the box.   
 
A key part of this business model is that the box and its software provide important user-
interface qualities that get the consumer to bring the box into their home, such as the ability to 
quickly and conveniently find, record, and playback specific content.  Once the box is in the home, 
the providers of cable TV services then sell further entertainment content such as individual on-
demand or pay-per-view performances, expanded networks, and the like.  Today, this business 
model operates through a set-top-box for TV content.  Tomorrow, it could be used to provide a 
range of services into a consumer’s home through a range of internet-of-things-driven-
appliances.   
 
Owners of the IP in the software that enables the features of these set-top-boxes or 
appliances see this business model as a particularly pernicious type of IP infringement.  They see 
the box as enabling a form of direct-to-consumer marketing, like a Trojan Horse point of sale for 
more electronic transmissions of entertainment content such as pay-per-view events or 
expanded bundles of channels and networks.  As with many contemporary appliances and 
electronic devices, cable TV set top boxes often are made in whole or in part outside of the US, 
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and therefore would ordinarily be subject to the jurisdiction of the ITC 337 docket.  The owners 
of the IP in the set-top-box-software have recently been facing an argument that this type of 
business model is outside the scope of the 337 docket because while the transaction with the 
consumers for set-top-boxes purports to be a “rental,” the statutory text of Section 337 limits its 
reach to settings in which there has been a “sale” (as in “importation for sale” and “sale after 
importation”). Certain Semiconductor Devices, 337-TA-1010 (Additional Views of Commissioner 
Kieff, April 18, 2017) (discussing distinction between a true lease and a security interest).   
 
This argument for avoiding the ITC’s 337 power has a prima facie link to private law in 
that it appears to draw a key distinction between two basic types of private law interactions:  
sales and rentals.  It also has the added appeal to a lay audience in that almost every customer 
of residential cable or internet service can relate to it from ordinary life experiences.  At least a 
few frustrating distinctions that flow from such a legal technicality are well known to most 
consumers of these services.  When equipment needed to operate the service breaks – like a 
cable TV set-top-box or an internet service provider’s special router – and customer service is 
sought, the feared response is that once bought, the equipment can no longer be returned.  Too 
bad, you own it.  When equipment needs to be tweaked before it can be put to a customer’s 
preferred use, and customer service is sought, the feared response is that it’s not yours, because 
its only rented, and so can’t be adjusted by the end user.  Too bad, you don’t own it.  Commercial 
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parties wrestle with this in bankruptcy cases involving personal property.  They must ask whether 
the party in possession has a mere contractual interest, a lease, leaving the asset out of the 
bankruptcy estate, or ownership encumbered by a security interest, which makes it part of the 
estate subject to foreclosure.   Certain Semiconductor Devices, 337-TA-1010 (Additional Views of 
Commissioner Kieff, April 18, 2017, at p. 6.   
 
While the distinctions between sales and rentals can have big differences for different 
areas of law, such as consumer warranties or taxes, the differences don’t have to be the same 
across all areas of law.  It turns out that in the long-standing tradition of private law, sales and 
rentals are more alike than different.  At least Article 9 of the UCC treats a very broad set of 
transactions including what lay audiences might split into categories of sales, rentals, and loans, 
as simply being members of one large category of encumbered sales that the UCC and the 
common law call security interests, but still sales, nonetheless.  Certain Semiconductor Devices, 
337-TA-1010 (Additional Views of Commissioner Kieff, April 18, 2017, at pp. 5-6).  Put differently, 
many things that look in many respects like some form of encumbered transfer, whether labeled 
as rental or not, have long been recognized through history and across today’s commercial 
system as various forms of sales.  Within the context of the ITC’s 337 docket, a petitioner might 
consider pursuing a well briefed argument pointing out that for purposes of private law like the 
Uniform Commercial Code, most rentals are merely a sub-category of sales (a restricted sale).  
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Such an argument might have the practical effect of defeating a respondent’s attempts to argue 
that some particular piece of equipment like a set-top-box is entirely outside the scope of Section 
337 if the equipment was transferred to a customer after importation into the country via a type 
of contract that appears to those less-familiar with the field of private law be a mere rental 
(rather than a sale).  After all, the field of private law treats what most lay people consider to be 
rentals as simply various types of sales.   
 
To be sure, it would be for the plaintiffs in any given case to decide to ground their 
arguments seeking 337 protection in this approach to private law that emphasizes the 
commonality between sales and rentals.  And it is for future work to explore the overall social 
costs and benefits to the ITC and the courts determining to embrace such an argument. This 
paper merely highlights how a deeper familiarity with the private law traditions that are explored 
so richly in Richard’s work may provide plaintiffs an added option to consider when facing cases 
like this.   
 
 In sum, both of these examples – “article” and “sale” – show how powerful a single word 
can be outcome determinative for ITC 337 litigations.  If there’s no sale or no article then the ITC 
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337 may not apply.21  That’s where facility with private law scholarship, including Richard’s appeal 
to pragmatism, the common law, and custom can be brought to bear.  Rather than get trapped 
in the broader policy debates about how much or little classes of plaintiffs should win or lose, 
decision-makers in business and law can be reminded about the types of key private law 
distinctions that have made long-standing differences.  And again, the litigation counsel need 
only remember to plead and prove along these lines while the business planning counsel need 
only select the options that best suit the business needs.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Richard Epstein’s insights about history and private law offer several practical solutions 
for the technologies of today and tomorrow.  They can offer significant leverage at the interface 
between IP and trade for professionals in business, law practice, academia, and government who 
are focused on many of the rapidly evolving technologies of tomorrow.  For adjudicators and 
policy makers, they largely address the intense concerns raised on both sides of typical policy 
debates while avoiding the arcane details of the black letter law legal regimes of IP and trade.  
For advocates and clients, they may offer practical guidance for both sides of potential lawsuits 
– at least in so far as plaintiffs elect to plead and prove them at trial and sustain them on appeal.22  
 
21 At least directly, to that act of importation.  Section 337 powers applied to other acts of importation likely provide 
authority for remedies that do reach these and other domains.   
22 As was done in Grokster, but largely not done in Limelight and ClearCorrect.   
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These lessons from history are only increasingly helpful as the economy sees more use of on-line 
sales platforms and distributed computing systems drive businesses for fin-tech, the internet-of-
things, and autonomous vehicles, and as old-fashioned business models increasingly operate 
across national boundaries with the help of electronics.     
 
***** 
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